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  ABSTRACT: This article investigates the regulations which should be applied in the 
financial system in order to minimize the losses. The subject is based on the banking policy of 
“privatisation of profits and nationalisation of losses” and it is debated mainly from trade 
articles point of view. Even when taxpayers do not agree, governments choose either to bailout 
influential banks or to cover their losses with a deposit insurance. Banks would take advantage 
of any opportunity to increase earnings, even in the insolvency stage, and thus certain 
regulations and limitations must be provided to minimize the moral hazard occurred. The most 
important problem that deepens financial regressions relates to the losses spillover effect on the 
worldwide economy, and although a perfect global banking model cannot be implemented, the 
paper suggests regulations which improve the financial systems. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
  The current banking crisis is very similar to past crises, as it started when the 
lending process was too superficial and did not provide any coverage. The significant 
difference is that the problem began in one of the most secure markets and it spread 
quickly all over the world. Nowadays, the worldwide question is whether the banks 
should be saved or not. The economic system stimulated banks through an unsuitable 
policy based on the privatisation of profits and nationalisation of losses. 
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  The aim of this paper is to find regulations to avoid future nationalisation of 
losses during crises. Such regulations and limitations depend on bank deficiencies and 
include factors such as capital, risk, liberalisation or transparency. 
 
2. BANK PERFORMANCE AND PROFIT SHARING 
 
  Entrepreneurs performance represents the driving factor behind investment 
banking, and they share the profits, but not the losses. Bankers save bonuses while 
losses accumulate, inducing a financial crisis for whom nobody can be held 
responsible. Unfortunately, the claim back resolution is not a recovery solution (Taleb, 
2009). 
  Smith and Watts (1992) argued that incentive compensation is practiced more 
in organisations with continuous development, and that growth is expected in banking 
firms more than in non-financial companies. On one hand, compensation does not 
depend on firm performance in restricted and controlled systems. On the other hand, in 
unrestrained industries, compensation is overburdened, and it is kept secret through 
management discretion. 
  Hubbard and Palia (1995) summarized the payment structure dependent on the 
economic environment. Organisation should have a well established regulation system 
with remuneration based on performance. When a bank deals with low level of risk, 
pay figures are lower as well. However, when the environment has a high level of risk, 
remuneration is higher. Therefore, managers prefer to keep safe contracts and low 
sensitivity between performance and risk. The shareholders’ interests need to support 
managerial bonuses, because when executive officers are not satisfied with their 
payments, the effectiveness may decrease. The equilibrium can be found when the 
shareholders maximize their wealth, while managers are fully protected from risky 
actions. 
  Remuneration system and shareholders’ large amount of bonuses have been 
the main problems related to banks for a long time. During financial crisis, although 
banks registered increasing losses on their balance sheets, managers wanted to raise the 
bonus pools. For example, at the beginning of 2008, Morgan Stanley declared $9.4 
billions losses for the last quarter, but increased its bonuses with 18% for the reason 
that employees should not suffer from the subprime market mistakes. It was discovered 
that managers had shared bonuses incorrectly, and the previous years amount was 
higher than the limit. Unless the explanations were plausible, the firm had to return the 
supplementary money and reconsider the bonus pool. Therefore, the compensation 
practices may deepen the financial crisis (Rajan, 2008). 
  John Thain, the former chief executive of Merrill Lynch, described bonuses as 
a “reward talent” and a key element for market liberalisation, but not a way to enrich 
bankers while their bank fails (Taleb, 2009). Besides the basic role of achievements 
reward, bonuses are supplemental revenues for managerial positions, and this second 
use is rapidly expanding. Also used for motivation, bonuses are claimed to be a 
fundamental incentive system. 
  Liang (1989) studied profits and their connection with market concentration 
and risks. Empirical studies demonstrated a close link between risk and profits. Higher  
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profits involve higher risks and therefore a series of supplementary costs, like higher 
payments to compensate the risk taken by investors with risk aversion. A second 
important link between the level of concentration and profits was discovered through 
the fact that banks obtain higher profits in concentrated markets because the 
environment implies less risk. This idea is known as the “quiet-life” theory and it 
suggests that “firms in concentrated markets have low ratio of profit variability to 
expected profits” (Liang, 1989, pp.297). The relationship between risk and profits is 
usually a direct one, as risk averse entrepreneurs may choose loans with low rates, but 
the profit rate expected is lower as well. A negative risk-profit relation occurs when 
losses follow banking actions and managers need to liquidate capital in order to pay 
debts. In this case, a higher risk implies a decrease in the bank profits. When the 
transparency of information is high, Houston and James (1995) observed that 
shareholders might constrain managers to take risks to gain more, but the risk averse 
managers would act only if they are protected with high compensation. 
  Over time, bankers took advantage of the system deficiencies in order to 
increase their profits. Even if high risk was involved, banks bet for their earnings, and 
in the unfortunate situation of insolvency, they waited to be rescued by the state. 
 
3. BANKING ACTIONS WHICH DETERIORATE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
 
  The following section will refer to banking issues, which deteriorate the 
financial situation and increase the losses. 
 
3.1. Insolvency stage 
 
  Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States have been 
confronting with constant bank failures due to the lack of diversification. The majority 
of banks were unit banks, established as one office only. Recently, the banks go down 
for much more complicated reasons. When loan portfolios are too concentrated, 
negative results in bank balances may appear, but central bank governors do not realise 
the problems in the incipient phase as banks are opaque. For this reason, in 1990s, the 
US crisis reached shortly $150 billions from loans and savings and the losses were 
already too big when the authorities realized the situation. 
  In his paper, Lastra (2008) summarised the British law for bank insolvency. 
Over the last months of 2007, The Northern Rock Bank received help consisting of 
liquidity assistance, deposits guarantee and nationalisation. The support given was not 
enough to recover, and thus the authorities started the insolvency procedure based on 
the Special Resolution Regime (SRR). The objectives of SRR were “financial stability, 
minimization of costs in the light of public interest considerations […] the protection 
of the confidence in the banking system” (Lastra, 2008, pp.169). An important thing to 
consider when a bank is legally insolvent is the contagion effect on other organisations. 
The losses will have an effect on shareholders and government, creditors or insurance 
companies, and this transforms insolvency into an issue of public interest. 
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3.2. Deposit insurance 
 
  Mayes (2005) described a black hole created when the process of bad lending 
leads to “largely valueless assets and a major contingent liability” (Mayes, 2005, 
pp.162). The author analysed the bank insolvency in transition countries and found out 
that some governments could not help troubled banks due to the lack of resources. This 
is the reason why banks tend to be small and choose not to diversify risk. It is 
important for banks to invest in a deposit insurance fund, which covers possible losses, 
otherwise, the insolvency process is the only situation considered. The security blanket 
of deposit insurance would increase depositors and creditors trust in bank and it would 
diminish the uncertainty and risk to be bailed out in case of bankruptcy. Usually, if 
individual banks deal with bankruptcy, the government would not try to help them. 
However, if many banks are endangered at the same time, public authorities have to 
support them. If some banks turn out to be indispensable, this high level of 
concentration may become a disadvantage of the banking system. This means that any 
changes in the policy of the bank will affect the rest of the system. This spillover effect 
is known as the “too big to fail” feature of banks. 
  Kaufman (2004) agreed on the importance of deposit insurance and analysed 
the activity of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) since 1980. The 
deposit insurance was defined as a government aid, which guarantees in general all the 
obligations of large and influential financial companies. When deposits and other debts 
are above the assets of a bank, the capital becomes negative and the bank is considered 
to fail. FDIC is a federal government agency and when the losses of a bank surpass its 
reserves and other supplemental revenues, additional help is required from government 
and taxpayers. The author understood that in case of insolvency the most important 
thing is to minimize losses because “it is the losses from bank failures more than the 
bank failures themselves that are most damaging to both most stakeholders of the 
failed banks and the FDIC” (Kaufman, 2004, pp.13). Walter (2005) stated in his work 
that FDIC first started insuring the deposit just before 1934 and it was created because 
the banking failure in the US was contagious. Before the FDIC existed, the depositors 
always checked their bank activity and in case of vulnerability signs, they withdrew 
their deposits. This way, the American government was always conscious of the 
banking activities. Once the FDIC started its activity, clients ceased to monitor their 
banks due to a feeling of protection. Unless they were insured, the most troubled and 
risky banks would have failed or had to pay higher interest rates to depositors. 
  The bank guarantee is very similar to deposit insurance, protecting the banks 
and their lenders from potential losses. During the 1990s crisis in Sweden, no bank 
reached the bankruptcy stage because the government decided to help all of them. It 
was considered that a large number of banks collapsing at the same time would greatly 
affect the system stability. Market players needed assurance for their activities; hence, 
to maintain confidence in the banking system, public authorities undertook a general 
bank guarantee. This way, the process of lending to banks is risk-free and taxpayers are 
the only ones to pay the price of guarantees. In the future, strict regulations must be 
applied, as the moral hazard is most probable to arise (Viotti, 2000). 
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3.3. Moral hazard 
 
  Newman (2004) considered that moral hazard represents the selection between 
risk sharing and incentives. Moral hazard raises both market players’ fortune and their 
risk bearing. No matter what the necessary effort level is, operations governed by 
moral hazard imply more risk. Wealthy customers do not usually perform in these 
conditions if they consider that the risk exceeds the effort. Therefore, it is presumed 
that the moral hazard in case of risk aversion generates risk aversion for the wealthy 
players while the poorer become risk-takers. Banerji and Van Long (2007) disagreed 
with this idea and considered that in a market suspected of moral hazard, only 
intermediate individuals would take actions, whereas the wealthier and poorer would 
not take any risk in lending procedures. 
  When the deposit insurance is not efficient, the financial component of the 
system is jeopardized. The deposit insurance is designed to cover small depositors’ 
potential losses and to limit the banks’ risky behaviour. The price of deposit insurance 
has a big impact on banks’ behaviour and consequently when banks are not charged for 
their hazardous actions, the government will be held responsible and forced to lavish 
them. Moral hazard is reluctant to solutions that include government bailout or other 
public resources’ contribution. Sometimes the system disorders may be the cause of a 
political abuse, which happens when the state invests money from general budget to 
keep banks afloat and avoid their bankruptcy (Beck, 2003). 
  Hellmann, et al. (2000) analysed the moral hazard induced by the security 
blanket and argued that regardless of the deposit insurance forms, during financial 
crisis a bailout would be necessary. The authors explained how state bailout 
encourages banks to “gamble on resurrection”, a possible action when depositors cease 
to monitor their bank activity. The gamble consists in creating a bank portfolio with 
risky assets in hope of increasing earnings; if the bet fails, customers and insurers will 
incur the losses. The solution for this problem is to find the Pareto-efficient 
equilibrium, which assumes an equal quantity of gambling and smart assets. The Pareto 
limit is not usually met because banks destabilise one another, creating the market-
stealing effect. When banks want to raise the market share, they practice the same 
interest rates as their competitors, but they buy safe assets. On the other hand, if they 
want to raise their profits through gambling, banks should attract deposits hence 
practice a higher interest rate. To attract customers and overcome the competitors’ 
market share, the first choice for banks is to raise the deposit rate. One of the causes of 
this fierce competition is the liberalisation of the banking system. 
 
3.4. Liberalisation process 
 
  The process of liberalisation diminishes systems barriers, by opening the 
market for foreign banks or reducing the interest rates. Banks become more flexible 
when influenced by strong competition, and the market stealing effect grows, as a 
potential crisis deepens (Hellmann, et al., 2000). A cause-effect relationship between 
liberalisation and financial crises is proved by major losses consisting of non-
performing loans and foreign debts. In the liberalisation process, banks with negative  
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net worth were allowed to get short-term loans and gamble for recovery. The 
government encouraged the international loans by keeping their costs at very low level 
and ensuring no consistent currency depreciation. The authorities permitted this loan 
process with no supplementary regulations or guarantees of risk management. The 
liberalisation process is essential for government, as it avoids entrepreneurs’ monopole 
by building new institutions which connect the state with key businesses. Additionally, 
the international market failed on monitoring this short-term lending, and could not 
resist the market pressure, so it pressured small financial markets to open. Therefore, 
liberalisation is the result of political pressures from both domestic and foreign 
countries. 
 
3.5. Political interests 
 
  Besides problems of political interest such as banks bailout and liberalisation, 
Sapienza (2009) stated in his work that state-owned banks usually practice lower 
interest rates than private banks because the political party associated with the bank has 
greater impact on the lending process. Sapienza conducted a research in Italy and 
found out that state-owned banks give rates with 44 basis points less than the private 
ones. The difference between interest rates has either social or political causes. The 
social view considers that these banks have lower costs, and they are more efficient. 
The political view considers that state-owned banks help firms which cannot take a 
loan because this is too expensive or difficult. The author considered that “both the 
social and political views would support the fact that state-owned banks apply higher 
discounts in southern Italy, which is poorer and characterized by widespread political 
patronage” (Sapienza, 2009, pp.380). 
 
3.6. Information transparency 
 
  Information clarity in the financial system is compulsory, as a disciplined 
market permits its investors to access all the information related to organisations, and it 
offers investors the possibility of influencing the managerial actions. When a market is 
monitored it emits signals, which are captured by the managers, and this way it occurs 
the process of influencing: when signals are positive, the investors are satisfied with 
the market; otherwise, if managers are advised to make changes in their organisation, 
the signals are negative. Moreover, when authorities rule a laissez-faire policy in the 
financial system, banks are not monitored. Therefore, they will try to disguise “the 
amount of bad debt on their balance sheet by rolling over and rescheduling loans that 
are in default” (Corbett &Mitchell, 1999, pp.2). This asymmetric information is always 
discovered during financial crises, when banks gradually disclose their bad debts, 
aggravating the banking sector problems. 
 
3.7. Recapitalisation 
 
  Chandrasekhar (2009) considered banks are the key element in the financial 
sector, as they represent the principal depositary institutions. In 1950 bank activity  
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covered more than 80% of the financial system. The first operations to be considered 
by a government in case of a financial system failure are “guaranteeing deposits, 
providing refinance against toxic assets and pumping in preference capital” 
(Chandrasekhar, 2009, pp.1). Toxic assets may incur losses which are so big that banks 
need to accept insolvency. These assets have low prices and banks are constraint to 
eliminate them in order to continue operating. Governments protect banks from the bad 
assets losses by injecting capital into them. This process, known as nationalisation or 
recapitalisation, “prevents the spread of fear and uncertainty among creditors or 
investors in the liabilities of banks, such as insurance and pension funds” 
(Chandrasekhar, 2009, pp.7). A way to infuse capital is by investing in senior preferred 
stocks and retrieve warrants. This way, the government has the right to buy common 
stocks at a price set in advance. A recapitalisation strategy should be accompanied by 
an insurance policy to control any losses from contaminated assets. 
  To increase banks assets, government may also allocate bonds, which 
compensate the liabilities of insolvent banks or represent new equity. Bonds can also 
be offered to the central bank, as a reward for helping commercial banks. Nevertheless, 
this second support reduces the commercial banks’ liabilities. 
 
4. AN EXAMPLE OF GOVERNMENT HELP DURING THE ACTUAL 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
  During this financial crisis, banks considered “too big to fail” asked for help, 
but the American government refused to stabilise all of them. International Monetary 
Fund declared in January the sum of $2.2 trillions for toxic assets in the United States, 
an amount that rose with $0.8 trillion in two months. The domino effect created after 
the collapse of a particular organisation depends not so much on the firm’s size, but on 
its role in the market on that specific time. Therefore, the government helped Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac because the bank supported 80% of the new mortgages and the 
process either continues or the housing market would be in even more difficulty. Their 
holders kept $5.4 trillions in bonds, which needed to be reassured. Otherwise, Freddie 
and Fannie would have increased the mortgage interest rates or even reduce the 
mortgages loans. If government would not have get involved in Freddie and Fannie 
situation, lower estate prices would affect the fiscal position deepening the recession. 
By August 2009, the government promised to keep Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
solvent. At that time, Fannie stated its losses for the second quarter – $14.8 billions – 
and asked for $10.6 billions more. Freddie had $64 billions of net losses since 2007 
and used $50 billions from the government aid (Scholtes, 2009). At the end of the same 
month, the shares of the two companies “burst into flames” because the US housing 
market stabilised and the short sellers bought shares to minimize their losses (Stacey 
&Scholtes, 2009). At the beginning of November, Fannie Mae declared $19.8 billions 
loss, the ninth consecutive deficient quarter and said that even more is expected. The 
company said it needs another $15 billions, but the Treasury did not agree because the 
effect on tax receipts would have been too big compared to Fannie results. 
  Lehman Brothers was the fourth largest investment bank in the United States 
but its “too big to fail” characteristic did not save it from the collapse. Its biggest loss  
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during crisis came from the property-related investments, which included sub-prime 
mortgages. Lehman tried to get help from the US government or to find a buyer, but 
investors and trading partners were leaving, although Lehman presented a last minute 
restructuring plan (Wearden, et al., 2008). Worldwide, the firm had 26,000 employees 
endangered to loose their job. Its shares fell dramatically in seven months, from $66 in 
February to $3.65 in September. The dollar lost power to both Euro and Yen and the 
systems needed to stabilise the markets hence the European Central Bank injected €30 
billions and the Bank of England £5 billions. On September 15, Lehman was urged to 
fill the chapter of the Bankruptcy Code and create a plan to pay its creditors. In six 
months, Lehman lost $6.7 billions, the assets were continually decreasing, and its debts 
were more than $600 billions The British Financial Services Authority refused “to 
import the cancer” even in the possibility of a buyer, like Barclays (Ferguson, 2009). 
Six months before Lehman collapsed, Bear Stearns faced similar facts, but the 
Treasury Department intervened. However, the US government saved Bear Stearns not 
because it was “too big to fail”, but too inter-connected for a sudden bankruptcy, and it 
had derivatives that worth $9 trillion, while Lehman Brothers had a tenth of that 
exposure. The BBC business editor Robert Peston, considered the bankruptcy of 
Lehman the “Wall Street's most extraordinary 24 hours since the late 1920s”. 
  Compared to the solutions adopted by the United States, Britain’s government 
tried to help the financial institutions as it considered that nationalisation is not a 
desirable way to work out. In the first quarter of 2009, statistics considered the UK as 
the first country in the world on bailing out banks (BBC, 2009). 
  At the beginning of 2009, the Royal Bank of Scotland stated the biggest loss in 
the UK’s corporate history, beyond £28 billions Although 70% of the bank was owned 
by taxpayers, the huge losses made government consider the nationalisation. For the 
recovery of RBS, the Treasury decided to apply an insurance strategy, which covers 
90% of the losses in investments (Elliott, et al., 2009). In February 2009, RBS declared 
that shareholders would share £950 millions as bonuses for 2008, depending on the 
number of employees that need to be fired. However, the UK did not agree on the fact 
that losses may be rewarded by bonuses (Eaglesham, et al., 2009). Financial Times 
reported that the RBS board threatens to retire if the bonuses sum is changed, but the 
authorities were advised by the Treasury to ignore the threat: “the government will 
never be taken seriously again on financial policy if it caves in to this blackmail”. To 
repay the government help, RBS had to withdraw £250 billions of its assets in the next 
four years, sell the insurance business, and dispose of the core business valuing £50 
billions (Goff, 2009). 
  Other British banks were endangered due to one of the biggest mistakes done 
during the recession, which was investing money in the property development when 
everybody else withdrew from it. This way HBOS, the biggest mortgage lender in the 
UK, lost £7 billions and faced a confidence crisis, eventually being bought by the 
Lloyd TSB for £12 billions (Financial Times, 2008). 
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5. REGULATIONS TO AVOID THE NATIONALISATION OF LOSSES 
 
  As explained above, banks losses are due to complex reasons, and authorities 
must adopt measures to minimize the system problems. The Banking Law Committee 
recommends surveillance focused on bank solidity, risk and transparency. In case of 
financial crisis, The Crisis Management Authority should be ready to act and provide 
efficient coordination between all institutions managing the crisis (Viotti, 2000). 
  Market discipline is vital to the national financial system, and it includes 
investors’ possibility to monitor actions and influence managers. The Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (1999, pp.17) considered that “market discipline imposes 
strong incentives on banks to conduct their business in a safe, sound and efficient 
manner”, and explained that a transparent bank gains more trust from market investors 
and more help in a secure investing. Market discipline offers information about banks 
performance, risk profile, risk management, and data which allows entrepreneurs to 
make well-founded risk-assessments. 
  The risk taken by banks differs. Commercial banks can easily go bankrupt 
because they weaken when a large number of depositors clear their accounts. The lost 
summed from investment banks are times bigger as the commercial banks losses. The 
effects of the systemic risk should be suppressed with “a brake on its carriers and 
require all products over a certain volume to be traded on an exchange rather than over 
the counter or, at a minimum, to create a mandatory central clearing house for them” 
(Butler &Patrick, 2009, pp.71). When banks figures are beyond banks capital 
requirements, regulations like restricting bonuses and payments should be applied, 
until proper ratios are achieved. Reestablishing secured ratios may be realized through 
raising capital or disposing the high risky assets. Regulators should encourage capital 
use, but with limitation for its use in investments, for example a percentage of profits. 
Furthermore, banks must discover risky assets and isolate them (Peter, 2009). 
  Financial liberalisation made national banks more dependent on international 
loans, as they became cheaper; hence, the system weaknesses were duplicated between 
banks, increasing their vulnerability. The liberalisation process ensures the market 
freedom whilst interest rates go up, raising the credit cost, and finally, causing an 
economic crash (Krohn, 2008). To avoid becoming “too big to fail”, all banks should 
be monitored, and in case of fraud and corruption, they must be vanished as soon as 
possible. For a better control, authorities should send signals to bankers to make them 
conscious of the penalties given in case of improper banking behavior. Poor 
management may lead to wrong decisions such as allowing bank resources exploitation 
or taking excessive risks for quick profits. The growth rate in banks needs limitation, 
otherwise bankers will use gambling to get instant earnings. Another way to prevent 
bank gambling is to offer better choices to invest money in and lower intermediation 
costs (Hellmann, et al., 2000). 
  When deposit insurance is used for non-monitored banks, the risk is transferred 
to taxpayers. If a society is not ready to protect itself, in order to save insolvent banks 
another way than providing a security blanket should be used (Mayes, 2005). The 
market evaluation is more simple and effective when deposit insurance exists, as the  
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authorities quickly observe the troubled banks, but creating a deposit insurance helps 
even troubled banks increase their profits (Walter, 2005). 
  As seen from the US and the UK study, governments share different opinions 
on the consequences of the banks failure if these are considered indispensable for the 
system. The true part of “too big to fail” myth has been known since the 1930s crisis: 
when a big bank fails with no consideration to its clients, especially creditors, the 
breakdown may engage a crucial recession as an effect of panic and surprising market 
decrease. However, it is crucial to understand the role of that bank in the economy at 
that certain moment. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
  The big banks losses undermine the worldwide economy, but even if bank 
profits are not nationalised, letting the banking system crash is not a solution. 
Authorities are also responsible when governments fail to monitor banking activities, 
and losses are so big that they produce a financial crisis. 
  One of the most challenging things to fulfill is to keep the transparency of 
information, so that investors are aware of the organisations performance, and the 
regulators apply new rules and limitations in order to improve the banking activity. 
Banks take huge risks for profits increase, as their insolvency stage usually transforms 
into a nationalisation of losses. The moral hazard appears when banks play an 
important role in the system, they gamble for recovery, or governments set deposits 
insurance. Either way, banks should be constrained in terms of risk, otherwise the 
losses continue growing. 
  During financial crisis, governments used different ways to support banks, but 
it appears that however big the bailout would be, banks always need more help. 
Taxpayers usually complain about government help, as individuals do not get any 
benefits from bank activities. A perfect global banking model cannot be provided, but 
it is crucial for the economies to monitor their financial systems and provide related 
regulations in order to avoid future big losses. 
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